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JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal of a final decision of the 
Eighth District Juvenile Court terminating the parental rights 
of Patrick Dean Coando. This court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-38-51(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The pertinent statutory provisions are, the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. Chapter 21, §1901 et seq.; Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-3a-401 to 414. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case originated as a petition for adoption, filed by 
the natural mother Debra Jean Robertson, in Eighth District 
Court. A petition was then filed to terminate the parental 
rights of Patrick Dean Coando, the natural father. The mater 
was transferred to the Juvenile Court. 
The appellant is a registered member of the Eastern 
Shoshone Tribe, as are the children. However, none of the 
children have ever resided on the reservation and the family 
maintained its domicile in the State of Utah. The mother and 
father were divorced on August 15, 1989, with the mother being 
granted custody of the minor children. Because the children 
were eligible for enrollment in the tribe, but had never been 
domicile on the reservation, the Juvenile Court ruled that 25 
U.S.C. § 1911(b) . applied to the proceedings. The court 
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allowed the tribe to intervene in the case, but denied removal 
to Tribal Court. The court found that the case was between 
parents and did not involve state agencies, that the natural 
mother and children objected to removal, that the case did not 
involve the removal of children from an Indian family, and 
that there would be an undue burden if the trial were moved 
out of state to Tribal Court. 
Trial was held on November 30, 1994, in the Eighth 
District Court. The mother and father were present and 
represented by counsel, as was the Tribe. The children were 
represented by the Guardian ad Litem. After trial the 
Juvenile Court took the matter under advisement. On May 25, 
1995, the Juvenile Court ruled in favor of the mother and 
terminated the parental rights of the father, finding him to 
be an unfit parent. The Juvenile Court found that the ICWA 
did not apply to the proceedings because there was no existing 
Indian family unit or environment, the action was not for 
removal of Indian children, and the fact of the case did not 
fall within the scope of Congress' intent in establishing the 
Indian Child Welfare Act. 
The natural father appeals from this decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The judgment of the Juvenile Court terminating the 
parental rights of the Appellant should be upheld because the 
facts justified a finding by clear and convincing evidence 
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that the father was unfit. The Indian Child Welfare Act puts 
no special burdens on the Appellee, as this is not an action 
for removal of Indian children from an Indian home or natural 
parent, nor are any state or private agencies involved in the 
action. As a result, state law was properly applied to the 
proceedings. Further, jurisdiction was properly retained by 
the Juvenile Court where the facts did not put the action 
under the Indian Child Welfare Act. However, even if the Act 
did apply, the standards and procedures required by the Act 
were met, and any error in the rulings of the Juvenile Court 
relating to the application of the Act amounts to harmless 
error. 
ARGUEMENT 
1. The Juvenile Court correctly retained jurisdiction 
as allowed under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 21 
USC 1911. 
A. The ICWA was enacted to protect the interests 
of Native American Tribes and families against 
unwarranted removal of children by state and 
private agencies, not to grant tribal member 
more rights than their non-member spouses. 
The ICWA was enacted in order to protect the cultural 
identities of Native American Tribes. The IWCA recognized 
that "there is no resource that is more vital to the continued 
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children." 
25 USCS § 1901(3). The removal of Indian children from an 
Indian family and their cultural setting eventually robs the 
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tribe of its members. And prevents the knowledge of Indian 
life from being passed on through oral traditions. Prior to 
the enactment of the IWCA, 
an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are 
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of 
their children from them by nontribal public and 
private agencies and that an alarmingly high 
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian 
foster and adoptive homes and institutions;... 
25 USCS § 1901(4), emphasis added. State court "often failed 
to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people 
and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian 
communities and families." 25 USCS § 1901(5), emphasis added. 
From the congressional findings in 25 USCS § 1901, it is clear 
that the purpose of the act is to protect the interest of the 
tribe in its children from non-Indian governmental agencies. 
Further, congress believed that the interest of the tribe was 
damaged when Indian children were removed from a culturally 
native American environment to be placed in a non-Indian 
environment. These interests which Congress sought to protect 
are not of an individual nature belonging to an individual 
parent, but rather they belong to the tribe. 
The stated policy was to: 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to 
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes 
and families by the establishment of minimum federal 
standards for the removal of Indian children from 
their families and the placement of such children in 
foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the 
unique values of Indian culture. . . 
25 USCS § 1902. In the present case the children are not 
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being removed from their home nor is there a governmental 
agency attempting to do so. 
To protect the rights of the tribe, the ICWA grants 
exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children that reside within 
the boundaries of the reservation. 25 USCS § 1911(a). The 
children in the present case have never resided on the 
reservation. In such cases, the ICWA also allows for the 
transfer of jurisdiction to the tribe where there is no good 
cause for the state court to retain jurisdiction, but this is 
subject to the "objection of either parent." 25 USCS § 
1911(b). The Tribe is also given the right to intervene in 
the state court proceedings. 25 USCS § 1911 (c ). The ICWA 
also ensures full faith and credit to tribal courts. However, 
the claim that these safeguards amount to a "preference that 
any proceeding to terminate the parent rights to Indian 
children be before the Tribal Court,'' (Appellant's Brief at 
9.) is unwarranted. Full faith and credit no more creates a 
preference in tribal court than it dose in any other court in 
the United States. It merely guarantees that the Tribal Court 
is treated equally. 
In the present case, the tribe was allowed to intervene 
and was represented by counsel. However, the natural mother 
(respondent) and custodial parent objected to transfer, as was 
her right under the ICWA. Memorandum Decision, at 2. Further, 
there was good cause for the court to retain jurisdiction. 
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Id. Transfer of jurisdiction would have forced mother, 
children and witnesses to travel out or state to a tribal 
reservation upon which neither mother nor children had 
resided. 
B. The Juvenile Court properly retained 
jurisdiction in this matter. 
The appellant argues extensively that the Juvenile Court 
erred in retaining jurisdiction. Appellant argues that the 
court can only retain jurisdiction if there is good cause or a 
Parent objects. Appellant's Brief at 10. Further, appellant 
asserts that the court must "start with the presumption that 
jurisdiction be transferred to Tribal Court." Id. The 
appellant then brushes aside the parental objection by 
claiming that an absolute veto would be "destructive to the 
tribal interests." Id. at 11. Appellant gives no reason why 
it would be harmful to tribal interest, nor does he explain 
how his suggestion of a "qualified veto" would work. 
The policy and purpose of the IWCA was stated as follows: 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy 
of this Nation to protect the best interest of 
Indian children and to promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families by the 
establishment of minimum federal standards for 
removal of children from their families and the 
placement of such children in foster or adoptive 
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian 
culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian 
tribes in the operation of child and family service 
programs. 
25 USCS § 1902. Further, Congress stated in §1901 that: 
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That an alarmingly high percentage of Indian 
families are broken up by the removal, often 
unwarranted, of their children from them by non 
tribal public and private agencies and that an 
alarmingly high percentage of such children are 
placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes 
and institutions; and 
That the States, exercising their recognized 
jurisdiction over Indian custody proceedings 
through administrative and judicial bodies, have 
often failed to recognize the essential tribal 
relations of Indian people and the cultural and 
social standards prevailing in Indian 
communities. 
25 USCS § 1901. What Congress was addressing in the IWCA was 
1) the removal of children from their "Indian families" by 
"state and private agencies" and their placement outside the 
family; 2) the failure of state courts to recognize the 
interests of the tribe; and 3) the failure of state courts to 
recognize the "cultural and social standards" prevailing in an 
Indian family unit. None of these concerns are at work in 
this case. 
First, the children are not being removed from their 
family unit. This action was instituted by the natural mother 
and custodial parent of the minor children. The children have 
always resided with the mother and are not being removed from 
her care nor from the home in which they are living. Further, 
there is no state or private agency involved in this case that 
is attempting to remove the children from the care of the 
custodial parent. The only involvement by any state agency 
came about after trial as a result of the court ordering the 
Department of Family Services to supervise visitation between 
(4) 
(5) 
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the father and minor children due to the father's history of 
violent and abusive behavior, as well as the fears expressed 
by the children to the court. 
Second, the interests of the tribe were recognized and 
the tribe was represented at trial by the tribal attorney. 
Further, the tribe was allowed to put on extensive testimony 
at trial relating to its interests and cultural matters. See, 
Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, at 174 - 194. 
From the testimony produced by the tribe, it was clear that 
the children had never been exposed to tribal culture or 
society. Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94 at 248; 
See, id. generally. Nor would it have been possible for Mr. 
Coando to teach the children of tribal culture and traditions. 
See, Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94 at 189-190. 
Third, because there was no Indian family the concerns 
that the court n.ight not recognize the standards that exist 
within Indian society do not come into play. The Children 
knew nothing of Indian society. The cultural standards that 
applied to the children and their family life was that of the 
non-Indian community. 
2. THE ICWA ALLOWS THE STATE COURT TO RETAIN 
JURISDICTION IF EITHER PARENT OBJECTS TO A TRANSFER 
TO TRIBAL COURT. 
Even leaving the policy issues aside, the Juvenile Court 
still acted properly in retaining jurisdiction. Section 1911 
provides that in an action for the 
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termination of parental rights to, an Indian child 
not domiciled or residing within the reservation of 
the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence 
of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such 
proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent 
the objection by either parent, . . . 
25 USCS § 1911(b), emphasis added. The natural mother 
objected to transfer of the case to Tribal Court. Memorandum 
and Decision, at 2. 
The issue of jurisdiction was ruled upon by the court on 
July 5, 1994. In its ruling, the Juvenile Court found that 1) 
the children were Indians within the meaning of 25 USCS § 
1901; 2) Section 1911 (b) of the ICWA applied because the 
children were not domiciled on the reservation; and 3) it was 
the mother's burden to show good cause why the case should not 
be transferred to tribal court. Memorandum Decision, July 5, 
1994. This is what the appellant asserts that this should be 
the case in his brief. And despite the fact that the Juvenile 
Court applied these standards, the court still found that it 
was appropriate to retain jurisdiction. 
In its decision, the Juvenile Court noted that the "non-
Indian natural mother and legal custodian of the 
children objects to the transfer of jurisdiction." Id. at 2. 
The court stated: 
That pursuant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody 
Proceedings, section C2, the Indian Child Welfare 
Act "gives the parents and the Tribal Court of the 
Indian child's tribe an absolute veto over 
transfers, and there is no need for any adversary 
proceeding if the parents or the Tribal Court 
9 
opposes transfer." 
Id. The court also noted that even though the court was not 
required to determine if a parent's veto was absolute, the act 
at least made the "transfer to Tribal Court discretionary with 
the State Court when there was an objection to the transfer by 
either parent. Id. 
Even so, the court went on to find that there was good 
cause. Citing the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for 
State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings section C2 and 
C3, the court noted that the following constituted "good cause 
to the contrary"; 
a. The Indian child is over 12 years of age and 
objects to the transfer. 
b. The evidence necessary to decide the case could 
not be adequately presented to the tribal Court 
without undo hardship to the parties or 
witnesses. 
Id. citing the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for State 
Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings section C2 and C3. 
The Juvenile Court properly noted that "David Allen Coando and 
Paul Dean Coando are twin boys, 14 years of age, who object to 
the transfer of jurisdiction to Tribal Court." Id. The 
Juvenile Court went on to find that all three children 
expressed serious fears regarding their father and their being 
on the reservation, as a result forcing them to go to the 
reservation for trial against their will "would be detrimental 
to their physical and emotional well-being and not in their 
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best interest." Id. 
The Juvenile Court also found that section 1911 (b) was 
satisfied in that there would be undue hardship if the 
petitioners were forced to travel to Wyoming for Tribal Court. 
Both parties had resided primarily in Utah and most of the 
witnesses lived in the Vernal area. Further, many of the 
witnesses were older and that an "undue hardship will be 
placed upon them to travel to the Tribal Court in Wyoming". 
Id. It is interesting to note that the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs has specifically recognized the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in its guidelines for state courts. The Montana 
Supreme Court also supported this view. See, Application of 
Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121, 125 (Mont. 1980). 
3. ALTHOUGH THE JUVENILE COURT RULED THAT THE ICWA DID 
NOT APPLY THE EVIDENCE STILL MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE ICWA. 
In addition the Juvenile Court noted that the ICWA was 
designed to protect the Indian family from being broken up by 
"non-tribal public and private agencies". Id. Further, the 
Juvenile Court found specifically that there was "no state 
agency seeking to remove the Indian children from their Indian 
home. The issue of termination of parental rights is between 
the natural parents and custody of the children will remain 
with a natural parent." Id. 
Finally, the Juvenile Court considered all these issues 
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together and weighed "the interests of the Indian Tribe 
pertaining to its children and its sovereignty with those of 
the parents, in this case each parent individually, and the 
interests of the children." Id. After weighing the competing 
interests the court found that the matter fell under 25 USC § 
1911(b), however, 
the controversy is between two parents and does not 
involve the breakup of Indian families by the 
removal of Indian children by non-tribal public and 
private agencies or the placement of the children in 
non-Indian foster or adoptive homes. Good cause 
exists to retain the matter in the State Court. The 
custodial parent objects to the transfer, and this 
Court finds that it does not run counter to the 
intent of the ICWA to retain jurisdiction in the 
State Court. 
Memorandum Decision, at 4. 
In making its ruling on jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court 
took into consideration several factors, including best 
interest of the children, hardship on the parties, the 
interest of the tribe, the objections of the mother to 
transfer, the objection of the two 14-year old boys. All of 
these together justified a finding of good cause to keep 
jurisdiction. This is true, even when discounting the fact 
that the wording of the ICWA grants a parent the right to veto 
transfer when the children are not domiciled on the 
reservation. Appellant's argument that jurisdiction was based 
solely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens as grounds for 
good cause is simply not supported by the facts. 
Appellant's extremely belabored argument that forum non 
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conveniens does not apply because of its placement in a 
discussion located in house report 1386 is lacking in merit. 
Further, if the court were to adopt Appellant's position there 
would be no doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
In his brief, Appellant relies on a number of cases which 
are not controlling in the case at hand. For example, 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. Holyfield 
dealt with the sole issue of domicile. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 US 30, 42, 104 L.ED 2d 29, 
42, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (1989). In that case the parents, who were 
both tribal members and residents of the reservation, 
intentionally went off the reservation for the birth of their 
illegitimate child. The purpose of this act was to avoid 
tribal jurisdiction and give the child up for adoption. The 
Supreme Court ruled that domicile was that of the parents 
{Holyfield, 490 U.S. 48.), and that individual tribal members 
could not avoid exclusive tribal jurisdiction simply by having 
the baby off the reservation. Id. at 51. These facts were 
similar to Matter of Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 
1986), where a child was taken off the reservation shortly 
after birth to be given up for adoption. The Court found that 
domicile was on the reservation. The issue of domicile is not 
relevant to the case at hand. Nor is it relevant to the issue 
of parental objection. All parties agreed that the children 
never resided on the reservation. Memorandum Decision, July 
13 
5, 1994, Therefore, only section 1911 (b) applies which 
allows an individual parent to object to removal to Tribal 
Court in actions that are already pending in state court. 
A. IN CASES FALLING UNDER 25 USC § 1911(B) THE 
PARENTAL VETO IS ABSOLUTE. 
Appellant asserts that Congress intended for there to be 
a "qualified veto" in order to deny removal to Tribal Court. 
Brief of Appellant, at 12. No justification for this position 
is given other than the claim that allowing "an absolute veto 
would foster the same type of forum shopping rejected in 
Holyfield." Id. This disregards the fact that Holyfield 
dealt with a completely different issue, that of a child 
domiciled on the reservation. In that situation the Tribe has 
exclusive jurisdiction. 25 USCS § 1911(a). It is only in a 
case such as the present one, where the child is not domiciled 
on the reservation, that gives rise to a parental objection 
being allowed. 25 USCS § 1911(b). Appellant's argument 
relating to parental object, therefore, lacks merit because 
the statute has already limited the objection to certain 
cases. The only forum shopping that is available is where a 
party seeks to avoid the state court by removing the 
proceedings to the Tribal Court. The proceedings cannot be 
removed from the Tribal Court. Further, adopting appellant's 
position on parental objection disallow the objection, as 
there would be no grounds which would justify its use. 
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Appellant cites a number of other cases relating to forum 
non conveniens, however, none of them add anything to the 
argument. They relate primarily to the fact that the doctrine 
"should be limited to meeting the objective of the ICWA" 
(Brief of Appellant at 14, citing In the Matter of Dependency 
and Neglect of A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1989)), and that 
"the Court should consider the rights of the child, the rights 
of the tribe and the rights of the parents" (Id. citing In the 
Interest of C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992)), all of which 
were done by the court. See, Memorandum Decision, July 5, 
1994. The Juvenile Court went beyond simply considering the 
objection of the parent, or the children, or the other 
traditional factors concerning forum non conveniens, and 
considered all the factors together as well. When considering 
all these factors together there can be no doubt that the 
Juvenile Court properly retained jurisdiction in this matter. 
4. THE JUVENILE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER ITS 
OWN RULINGS. 
The Appellant makes the claim that the Juvenile Court 
erred in reconsidering a prior decision. This claim is based 
upon the Memorandum Decision of July 5, 1994 (attached as 
appendix), and the final ruling of the Court dated June 29, 
1994, (attached as appendix). Appellant asserts that the 
doctrine of "law of the case" prevents the court from 
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reconsidering a prior ruling by a different judge of the same 
court in the same case. Brief of Appellant, at 17-19. 
However, Appellant noted that there are circumstances where 
the court may reconsider a previous ruling. For example, if 
the court believes it has made an error or if new facts are 
presented. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P. 2d 1306, 
1311 (Utah App. 1994). 
A. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT OVERRULE ITS 
PREVIOUS DECISION. 
Although the Juvenile Court stated that it reconsidered 
the previous ruling, the court did not actually overrule the 
previous decision. Judge Lindsay's Memorandum Decision of 
July 5, 1994, addressed only the issue of whether the case 
should be transferred to Tribal Court. In that decision, 
Judge Lindsay found that Section 1911(b) of ICWA applied to 
the proceeding. This section deals solely with the transfer 
of a case to Tribal Court, not the standards and procedures 
for the actual trial. 25 USCS § 1911. Judge Wilson did not 
address this issue, did not overrule it, nor was there a need 
to do so. Judge Lindsay had already determined that 
jurisdiction should remain with the Juvenile Court and the 
Tribe was allowed to intervene. Judge Wilson decision went to 
the Tribe's motion to dismiss, which was an entirely different 
matter from the jurisdictional ruling. As a result, the 
Appellant's argument that the Juvenile Court erred in 
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reconsidering Judge Lindsay's ruling is not relevant in this 
case, or amounts to harmless error. 
5. THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE STANDARDS FOR 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE ICWA DID 
NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE 
The court properly found that the ICWA did not apply. 
There were several significant factors that justified this 
decision. First, the court found that "this action is not for 
the removal of Indian children from an existing family unit". 
Finding of Facts, Order and Decree, 2, June 29, 1995; See 
also, Memorandum Decision at 4. Second, there was no Indian 
family unit. Finding of Facts, Order and Decree, 2. Third, no 
state or private agencies were involved. Finding of Facts, 
Order and Decree, 2; Memorandum and Decision, at 4. 
The Juvenile Court found that the "specific facts of this 
case are not within the scope of Congress' intent in 
establishing the Indian Child Welfare Act. Therefore, the 
court concludes that the legal and procedural standards of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act dose not apply in this case." Finding 
of Facts, Order and Decree, 2. 
The stated policy of Congress was to: 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to 
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes 
and families by the establishment of minimum federal 
standards for the removal of Indian children from 
their families and the placement of such children in 
foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the 
unique values of Indian culture. . . 
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25 USCS § 1902. Of main concern was the breakup of "Indian 
families'' by nontribal public and private agencies (25 USCS § 
1901(4)), and the failure of courts to recognize "essential 
tribal relations. . .and the cultural and social standards 
prevailing in Indian communities and families." 25 USCS § 
1901(5). Nowhere is an action by one parent against the other 
mentioned. An action between private parties, where one is a 
non-indian "does not fall within the ambit of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act." Application of Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121, 125 
(Mont. 1980). Nor was the Act "directed at disputes between 
Indian families." Id. The purpose was to grant a certain 
amount of protection to the cultural identity of Indian Tribe 
and a recognition of the cultural values existing in an Indian 
family. See, 25 USCS § 1901(3). This does not mean that an 
Indian parent was to be granted greater rights than the non-
Indian custodial parent. Nor does it mean that all aspect of 
the ICWA apply in every case. 
In the present case, the children were enrolled as tribal 
members after the mother initiated the action for termination 
of parental rights. As a result, the Tribe was allowed to 
intervene in the proceedings and counsel was appointed for the 
father. See, 25 USCS § 1911 ( c) ; § 1912(a), (b) . However, 
not all parts of the ICWA apply in all cases. Section 1911(a) 
as already discussed above, applies only in cases where the 
child is domiciled on the reservation. Other sections can 
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only reasonably be attributed to cases were there is 
intervention by state agencies. An example of this is section 
1912(d), which requires remedial services and rehabilitative 
programs be provided. 
A. A PARENT SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE 
SAME REMEDIAL SERVICES AS IS THE STATE IN A 
REMOVAL ACTION. 
Appellant argues that the mother provide "remedial and 
rehabilitative programs and preventative measures designed to 
prevent the break up of the Indian family must be undertaken 
and these efforts proven unsuccessful". Brief of Appellant at 
22, citing 25 USCS § 1912(d). The problems with this is that 
such programs can only be provided by governmental agencies. 
They require expertise to establish and millions of dollars to 
run. It would be unreasonable and unfair to require the 
parent to provide such programs. (This is one reason why the 
ICWA deals with governmental agencies and not "parent vs. 
Parent" issues.) At best, the mother could be held to attempt 
reasonable efforts to prevent the breakup of the family. And 
this she did. The father never supported the children. 
Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, 20 - 101, 
generally. Even making his wife pay him to baby sit the 
children. Id. at 69. He physically and mentally abused the 
wife. Id. When he was in prison for assault on the mother, 
the mother took the children to see him. Id at 22-24. 
However, the father's violent and abusive behavior made it 
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impossible and unreasonable for the mother to do more than she 
did. Further, it was the children's desire that they not see 
the father. Id. at 24; See, testimony of David Coando and Pau 
Coando, generally, 225-249. It would be unreasonable to 
require a mother, who had been severely mistreated, whose 
children were terrified of their father, to do more. Further, 
the father never provided support for the children or 
undertook any reasonable efforts on his part to repair the 
relationship. 
B. THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN INDIAN FAMILY OR 
THE REMOVAL OF INDIAN CHILDREN FROM THE FAMILY. 
Of greater importance to finding that the IWCA did not 
apply was the court's finding that there was no Indian family 
to breakup. Finding of Facts, Order and Decree, 2, June 29, 
1995. The facts supporting this finding were: 
1) The children never resided on the reservation, 
2) The father did not support the children. 
3) The children always resided with the non-Indian 
mother. 
4) There had been no effort by either parent to 
raise the children in an Indian cultural setting. 
5) The children did not consider themselves to be 
Indians and knew very little about Indian ways. 
There was a great deal of testimony about Indian culture 
and values. See, Testimony of Mr. Wise, Transcript of Hearing 
on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, at 174 - 194. This testimony made 
clear a number of import facts. First, Mr. Coando never 
attempted to raise the children in the Indian way. Second, Mr. 
Wise testified that an abusive person Like Mr. Coando, could 
20 
not pass on properly the oral traditions necessary to raise a 
family in the Indian way. Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 
and 12/1/94 at 189-90. Third, a person could not be forced 
into the Indian culture. Id. at 187-89. And fourth, the 
children never lived in a native American setting. Id. at 
173-174. 
Because the whole purpose of the ICWA is to prevent the 
destruction of Indian culture and way of life, as well as 
prevent courts from applying standards that do not apply to a 
traditional Indian family environment, the purpose cannot 
fairly be applied where no such environment exists. Further, 
the children are not being removed from their family setting 
at all. This is a key factor in the policy behind the act. 
Section 1902 establishes "minimum federal standards for the 
removal of Indian children from their families". 25 USCS § 
1902. These standards do not rightfully apply where the 
children are not being removed from their family by a 
governmental agency. See, K.E. v. State of Utah, 285 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 1996). 
C. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS ONLY REQUIRED IN CASES 
WHERE THE STATE IS SEEKING TO REMOVE CHILDREN 
FROM AN INDIAN FAMILY. 
In K.E. v. State of Utah, 285 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah 
App. 1996), this Court noted that "the ICWA only requires the 
State to present qualified expert testimony on the issue of 
whether serious harm to the Indian child is likely to occur if 
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the child is not removed from the home." Id. at 27, citing In 
re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Neb. 1992). The children were 
not being removed from the home, nor were they in the custody 
of the appellant. 
Appellant argues that a natural parent is required to 
provide expert testimony "that continued custody of the child 
by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 USCS § 
1912(f). Assuming that this requirement applies in the case 
at hand, the requirement was met. Mr. Augustus testified that 
he was a licensed Clinical Social Worker with a Masters in 
Sociology and a Masters in Social Work. Further, he had been 
working in the field since 1970, primarily with children and 
families. Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, at 2-
3. Mr. Augustus was qualified to be an expert and testified 
that the time he spent with the children was adequate to 
determine that serious emotional or physical damage would 
result if Mr. Coando's parental rights were not terminated. 
Id. at 205-06, 210. (There are no time requirements for such 
interviews) The fact that Mr. Augustus had little experience 
with the ICWA is irrelevant, since he was not testifying as a 
legal expert. Mr. Augustus' expertise was that of a 
counselor, who deals with people, not statutes. Expert do not 
need to be versed in the ICWA nor even in Indian culture. 
This Court has noted that "professionals having substantial 
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education and experience in child welfare might well qualify 
as expert witnesses under ICWA, even though their experience 
with Indians is limited." In K.E. v. State of Utah, at 27. 
a) MR. AUGUSTUS SATISFIED THE QUALIFICATIONS 
OF AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
In the Matter of M.E.M. , 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981), used 
the Department of Interior Guidelines to aid it in determining 
who qualified as an expert under the ICWA. The Montana 
Supreme Court felt that this was appropriate since a 
"qualified expert witness" is not defined under the act and 
because the Court felt that the "guidelines comport with the 
spirit of the ICWA." In the Matter of M.E.M. , at . Of 
the three examples cited, the third is applicable to Mr. 
Augustus. Such an expert is described as a "professional 
person having substantial education and experience in the area 
of his or her specialty." Id.; K.E. v. State of Utah, at 27. 
Proper foundation was laid to qualify Mr. Augustus under this 
category and no objection was made. 
6. THE STANDARD OF PROOF THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE IS 
THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD APPLICABLE IN 
STATE COURT. BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT ONLY APPLIES 
TO EXPERT TESTIMONY IN STATE REMOVAL CASES. 
The standards of proof that apply to this case are clear 
and convincing. In K.E. v. State of Utah, this court found 
that there was a "dual burden of proof" wherein state and 
federal requirements are satisfied separately. K.E. v. State 
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of Utah, at 26-27. The burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
is employed only in relation to expert testimony as to harm to 
the child and then only in termination cases where the child 
is being removed from the home. Id.} 25 USCS § 1912(f). All 
other aspects are governed by the state standards of clear and 
convincing. However, because the children are not being 
removed from the home, there is no need for the expert 
testimony. 
Even assuming that expert testimony was required the 
testimony was sufficient to make a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that failure to remove the children from the "custody" 
of the father "would result in serious emotional damage" to 
the children. The was evidence that Mr. Coando subjected the 
children to emotional distress. Transcript of Hearing on 
11/30/94 and 12/1/94, 205-206. That he had neglected and 
failed to support: his children. That he was constantly 
intoxicated and abusive when he was at home. That he 
physically abused his wife if front of the children. And that 
the only respite in this behavior was when he was in prison. 
Id., generally. 
There was adequate evidence to support a finding under 
clear and convincing. The evidence supported a finding that 
would allow termination of parental rights under five of the 
seven grounds listed in U.C.A. § 78-3a-407. The father failed 
to support the children. He was found to be unfit or 
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incompetent to care for the children. Findings of Facts, 
Order and Decree, at 4. He had been incarcerated for long 
periods of time. Id. at 3. Failure of parental adjustment. 
See, Id. at 5. The father had made only token efforts to 
support the children, to prevent neglect, to eliminate risk of 
serious physical, mental or emotional abuse of the children. 
Id at 3. Or to avoid being an unfit parent. Id at 4. Each 
of these findings taken by themselves constitute grounds for 
termination. U.C.A. § 78-3a-408. Taken they more than 
satisfy burden of proof required for termination. 
7. THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM ACTED PROPERLY AND ANY ACTIONS 
TAKEN BY HIM ABE NOT GROUNDS FOR APPEAL. 
The Guardian ad Litem was appointed pursuant to U.C.A. § 
55-16-7. Appointment was justified due to the violent and 
abusive history of Mr. Coando, his failure to support the 
children, his neglect of the children, and the fears the 
children had of their father. The Guardian ad Litem has the 
duty to represent the best interests of the minor children. 
He does not have the duty to look after the parent's best 
interest or that of the tribe. The main point of Appellant's 
argument is that Mr. Austin did not agree with Mr. Coando. 
This is not grounds for appeal. 
Appellant argues that because Mr. Austin decided it was 
necessary to take a more active role than he at first 
intended, that this is somehow prejudicial. Appellant argues 
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that Mr. Coando felt bad. Brief of Appellant, at 34. 
Appellant complains that the questions asked by Mr. Austin 
were "combative". Id at 32. The question Appellant complains 
of was not allowed by the Judge, and is not prejudicial 
because it was not allowed. However, the point that the 
Guardian ad Litem was bringing out was that Mr. Coando had 
never attempted to raise his children in the Indian way. None 
of this is grounds for appeal. An appeal cannot be made on 
the grounds that the other attorney did not agree with you, or 
that your client felt bad as a result. 
Appellant complains that Mr. Austin asked that Mr. Coando 
be barred from the court room. The motion was made after Mr. 
Coando had left the courtroom. Mr. Coando had continually 
disrupted court proceedings throughout the course of the 
trial, causing numerous delays. See, Record generally. 
During one such outburst apellant's attorney stated that it 
would be necessary for Mr. Coando to remain outside the 
courtroom if the case was to proceed. Transcript of Hearing on 
11/30/94 and 12/1/94, at 12-13. The motion, however, was 
denied. The fact that a party makes such a motion, so that he 
can get through his closing arguments, is not grounds for 
appeal, especially where the motion is denied. 
The appellant is unhappy that the Guardian ad Litem took 
the position that the children were not living as part of the 
Indian culture, and should not be forced to do so against 
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their wishes. This was the position taken by the tribe as 
well. Appellant takes exception with statements by Mr. Austin 
during closing argument that race was not an issue, but that 
"[w]hat is important is culture identity." Brief of Appellant 
at 32. The appellant quotes most of this particular statement 
in its brief. Brief of Appellant at 33. However, appellant 
leaves off the last sentence, where Mr. Austin states that, 
the children's cultural setting "may change in the future, but 
like Mr. Wise said, that is to be - that should be their 
decision and no one else's. Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 
and 12/1/94, at 312. The point being, once again, that the 
interest of the Tribe is in maintaining its culture and 
society, but it cannot be forced upon anyone. The Guardian ad 
Litem never decided that the children had no interest in being 
Indian (Brief of Appellant at 34), but rather agreed with the 
Tribe that it must be the children's decision. The Tribe's 
interest in these matters could best be realized if the 
negative influence of the father were not present to dissuade 
the children. 
Appellant also argues that the Guardian ad Litem did not 
draft a list of issues to be addressed in a psychological exam 
before taking the children to Ute Tribal Psychologist. This 
is simply not true. The issues were determined by the 
Juvenile Court, and the Guardian ad Litem was to provide a 
background statement. The fact that the Guardian ad Litem 
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acted upon the findings of the psychologist to protect the 
child and terminate visitation, is not grounds for appeal. It 
was the duty of the Guardian ad Litem, as the children's 
attorney, to represent their best interests. If in looking 
after the best interest of his clients the Mr. Austin "became 
an advocate against Mr. Coando" (Brief of Appellant at 35) 
then this was appropriate. And being appropriate, could not 
have "created undue bias and prejudice against Mr. Coando in 
the mind of Court." Id. If anyone has acted unethically it 
is the attorney for the appellant for bringing such frivolous 
claims, based only on the fact that someone disagreed with the 
appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should uphold the ruling of the Juvenile Court 
terminating the parental right of Mr. Coando. The Juvenile 
Court did not overrule itself. Sections 1912 (d) and (f) do 
not apply in the case at hand. Nor does the ICWA require 
expert testimony and proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the 
harm to the children where the children are not being removed 
from the home nor from an Indian family. Even if such proof 
were required, the evidence was sufficient to support such a 
finding. Nor were the actions of the Guardian ad Litem in an 
adversarial proceeding prejudicial. The Court, should 
therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. 
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DATED: this >"JY day of July, 1996. 
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APPENDIX 
Memorandum Decision, July 5, 1994 
Finding of Facts, Order and Decree, 2, June 29, 1995 
Indian Child Welfare Act 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Interest of: 
David Alan Coando 
Sky Deona Coando 
Paul Dean Coando 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Comes now the Court in the above entitled matter and 
hereby rules on the jurisdictional Motion to Stay 
Proceeding and Transfer to the Tribal Court filed oy 
Patrick D. Coando on November 8, 1993, and the 
jurisdictional Motion for Transfer of Jurisdiction filed 
by Mr. John C. Schumacher on behalf of the Eastern 
Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation in Fort 
Washakie, Wyoming. The Court held hearings on November 
18, 1993 and March 3, 1994 and heard proffers and argument 
form counsel. Present at the hearing on November 18, 
1993, was Mr. John Beaslin representing Debra Jean ^ 
Robertson and Mr. Dixon Hindley representing Patrick 
Coando. Present at the hearing held on March 3, 1994, was 
Mr. Jose Luis Trujillo and Mr. John C. Schumacher 
representing the Eastern Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River 
Reservation, Mr. Larry A. Steele, Guardian Ad Litem, Mr. 
Patrick A. Coando who was represented by his attorney of 
record, Dixon D. Hindley, and Debra Jean Robertson, who 
was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. John C. 
Beaslin. The Court considered the Memorandums of Law and 
Points of Authority filed by all parties, and being fully 
advised in the premises, now makes the following order: 
1. That counsel for the parties have made the 
following stipulate on: 
a. That the above named minors are Indian 
children, within the meaning of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act, 25 United States Code, 
Section 1901, et seq. 1978. 
b. That the above named minors are not 
domiciled on the reservation and thereby 
Section 1911 (b) of the Act applies to this 
proceeding. 
c. That the burden of proof is on Debra Jean 
Robertson, the party seeking termination of 
parental rights, to show good cause why 
this matter should not be transferred to 
the Tribal Court. 
2. That the State Court pursuant to Section 1911 (b) 
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS) is required to 
transfer a proceeding for the termination of parental 
rights to an Indian child not domiciled within the 
reservation to the Indian child's Tribe in the absence of 
good cause to the contrary and absent objection by either 
parent. 
3. That Debra Jean Robertson, the non-Indian natural 
mother and legal custodian of the above-named children, 
objects to the transfer of jurisdiction of this matter to 
the Tribal Court on the ground that she and the children 
are sufficiently removed form the Tribe and its ways to 
justify giving jurisdiction over to a non-Indian Court. 
Mrs. Robertson has never resided on the reservation and 
neither have the children's. The only contact the 
children have had with their Indian father has been 
minimal and the children perceive that contact to be a 
negative experience. 
4. That pursuant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody 
Proceedings, section C2, the Indian Child Welfare Act 
"gives the parents and the Tribal Court of the Indian 
child's tribe an absolute veto over transfers, and there 
is no need for any adversary proceeding if the parents or 
the Tribal Court opposes transfer." 
5. That it is not necessary for this Court to 
determine whether an objection by one parent to the 
transfer of jurisdiction to the Tribal Court is an 
absolute veto to the application of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act because good cause exists to retain this 
matter in the Eighth District Juvenile Court. 
6. That even though the Court is not required to 
determine whether one parent's objection to the transfer 
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of jurisdiction to the Tribal Court is an absolute veto to 
the transfer, the plain meaning of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act provides that the Court consider an objection 
by either parent. In the least the Act makes transfer of 
jurisdiction to a Tribal Court discretionary with the 
State Court when there is an objection to the transfer by 
either parent. 
7. That pursuant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody 
Proceedings section C2 and C3, the following constitutes 
"good cause to the contrary"; 
a. The Indian child is over 12 years of age 
and objects to the transfer. 
b. The evidence necessary to decide the case 
could not be adequately presented to the 
Tribal Court without undo hardship to the 
parties or the witnesses. 
8. That David Allen Coando and Paul Dean Coando are 
twin boys, 14 years of age, who object to the transfer of 
jurisdiction to the Tribal Court. These boys have 
personal memories of their father, Patrick D. Coando, 
beating their mother on a number of occasions. They are 
extremely fearful of their father. They remember their 
father taking them from the custody of their mother and 
without her knowledge or permission to the Indian 
reservation where he told they would never see their 
mother again. Although the boys views may have been 
colored by the fears and opinions of their mother, their 
determination is clearly based on their experiences and 
observations with their father and is not merely a 
reflection of their mother's objection. To require them 
to travel at this time to the Indian reservation for 
Tribal Court would be detrimental to their physical and 
emotional well-being and not in their best interest. The 
boys perceive that they are not safe on the reservation. 
9. That Sky Deona Coando, the 7 year old daughter of 
the parties, objects to the transfer of jurisdiction of 
this matter to the Tribal Court based upon personal 
memories and nightmares she has of an occasion when her 
father physically attacked her mother in her presence. 
Sky was knocked down during the struggle, and her father 
tried to take her away from her mother. To require Sky to 
travel to the reservation at this time would be seriously 
detrimental to her emotional stability because she 
perceives that she is not safe on the reservation. 
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10. That good cause exists to retain this case in the 
state Court because the evidence necessary to decide this 
case could not be adequately presented in the Tribal Court 
without undo hardship to the parties or the witnesses. In 
this case the Tribal Court of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe 
of the Wind River Reservation is 5 hours driving time from 
Vernal, Utah, the home of the Petitioners. The parties 
and minor children have resided primarily in Vernal, Utah 
and Roosevelt, Utah and the witnesses required for the 
termination hearing primarily reside in the Vernal and 
Roosevelt area. Many of the witnesses are older and an 
undo hardship will be placed upon them to travel to the 
Tribal Court in Wyoming. 
11. That the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS) was 
enacted to address congressional findings set forth in 
section 1901 in paragraph four "that an alarmingly high 
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the 
removal, often unwarranted, of their children by 
non-Tribal public and private agencies, and that an 
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in 
non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions." 
12. That the above entitled matter is a dispute 
between the natural parents of the above named three minor 
children. There is no state or private agency seeking to 
remove the Indian children from their Indian home. The 
issue of termination of parental rights is between the 
natural parents and custody of the children will remain 
with a natural parent. 
13. That the Court must weigh the interests of the 
Indian Tribe pertaining to its children and its 
sovereignty with those of the parents, in this case each 
parent individually, and the interests of the children. 
The ICWA gives parents an opportunity to object to the 
transfer of the jurisdiction to the Tribal Court, and that 
Act gives parties the opportunity to show "good cause" why 
jurisdiction should not be transferred. Upon balancing 
these competing interests, this Court finds that while 
this matter comes within the ICWA pursuant to section 1911 
(b) (action to terminate parental rights), the controversy 
is between two parents and does not involve the breakup of 
Indian families by the removal of Indian children by 
non-Tribal public and private agencies or the placement of 
the children in non-Indian foster or adoptive homes. Good 
cause exists to retain the matter in the State Court. The 
custodial parent objects to the transfer, and this Court 
finds that it does not run 
counter to the intent of the ICWA to retain jurisdiction 
in the State Court. 
Dated this July 5, 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
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EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
Coando, David Alan 12-02-79 
Coando, Paul Dean 12-02-79 
Coando, Sky Deona 04-15-87 
Children under 18 years of age 
( FINDING OF FACTS 
( ORDER AND DECREE 
( CASE NO. 856709 
( 856706 
( 856707 
( Judge Jeril B. Wilson 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Judge Jeril B. Wilson for trial 
on November 30th and December 1st 1994. The Petitioner, Debra Robertson was present, 
and was represented by counsel, John C. Beaslin; the Defendant Patrick Coando was present, 
and was represented by counsel, Cindy Barton-Coombs; the Eastern Shoshone Tribe was 
represented by counsel, John C. Schumacher; the children were represented by Eugene 
Austin, Guardian ad Litem. The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and 
having taken the matter under advisement now enters the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Order, based upon the law; the exhibits, the briefs that were 
submitted, and the testimony given. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This court has reconsidered the March 23, 1994 order of Judge Lindsay, issued prior 
to the conclusion of the case, and finds that the children have spent their entire lives with 
their custodial mother with frequent aid from relatives, and have had minimal contact with 
their natural father. 
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2. The children have no real attachment to nor affection for their Indian father and 
members of his family. 
3. There is no existing Indian family unit or environment from which the children are 
being removed. 
4. The Indian father has not maintained custody of the children and the mother is 
non-Indian. 
5. Even though the children are certified with the Eastern Shoshone Tribe as enrolled 
members, this action is not for the removal of Indian children from an existing Indian family 
unit, and the termination of Mr. Coando's parental rights will not result in the break-up of 
an Indian family. 
6. The specific facts of this case are not within the scope of Congress intent in 
establishing the Indian Child Welfare Act. Therefore, the court concludes that the legal and 
procedural standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act do not apply in this case. 
7. That these findings are convincing grounds to reconsider the previous order of Judge 
Lindsay dated March 23, 1994 to correct clear error and prevent manifest injustice. 
TERMINATION OF FATHER PARENTAL RIGHTS 
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. David Allen Coando and Paul Dean Coando were born December 2, 1979 
and Sky Deona Coando was born April 15, 1987. They are the natural children of 
Debra Robertson and Patrick Coando. 
2. Debra Robertson and Patrick Coando were married in 1985 or 1986 and were 
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divorced August 15, 1989. The divorce decree gave custody of the 3 children to 
Debra Robertson. 
3. Mr. Coando has been incarcerated three times since the birth of the twins, David 
and Paul most recently from July 10, 1990 to July 24, 1994 as a result of a conviction of 
felony assault against Mrs. Robertson. Which fact is evidence of grounds for termination 
pursuant to 78-3a-408 (2)(e) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
4. On July 10, 1990 Mr. Coando broke into Mrs. Robertson's home and assaulted her 
by hitting and kicking her. When she tried to flee Mr. Coando grabbed ahold of her hair 
and yanked her back into the house. She tried to flee a second time and Mr. Coando caught 
up with her and knocked her to the road and dragged her back into the house again. 
Sky, age three, witnessed this assault and was knocked down during it. Mrs. Robertson 
then ran to a neighbor for help and called 911. Mr. Coando placed Sky in his car and was 
attempting to leave when the police arrived. 
5. Mr. Coando has failed to provide support for the children. Therefore the Court finds 
that Mr. Coando has failed to support his children pursuant to 78-3a-407(6)(a) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
6. Mr. Conado has frequently been inebriated, sometimes in the presence of the 
children. 
7. On one occasion in 1979 Mr. Coando was tending the twins, David and Paul, and 
Mrs. Robertson returned to find Mr. Coando passed out from drinking and a bag of 
marijuana on the living room floor. Such actions constitute a failure to prevent the neglect 
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of the children,, pursuant to 78-3a-407(6)(b) Utah code Annotated 1953, as amended. The 
Court further finds that this event was but a sampling from the testimony offered evidencing 
a habitual or excessive use of intoxication liquor, controlled substances, and dangerous 
drugs, to the extent that Mr. Coando would be rendered unable to care for the child, 
pursuant to 78-3a-408 (2)(c) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
8. Throughout their relationship, on numerous occasion, Mr. Coando would threaten 
Mrs. Robertson with physical harm including threatening to kill her. 
9. Frequently Mr. Coando would take part of Mrs. Robertson's paychecks by 
threatening her with physical harm, 
10. Frequently Mr. Coando would threaten Mrs. Robertson with taking the children and 
that she would never see them again. 
11. Mr. Coando has a history of violent behavior. 
12. Mr. Coando is unfit or incompetent to parent the children which fact is seriously 
detrimental to the children, in that he has made no more than token efforts to support or 
communicate with the children, to prevent neglect of the children, to eliminate the risk of 
serious physical, mental, or emotional abuse of the children, or to avoid being an unfit 
parent, which constitutes grounds for termination of parental rights under 78-3a-407 (6) 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
13. It is in the best interest and welfare of the children that Mr. Coando's rights 
be terminated. 
14. Mr. Coando has for many years put his own needs and welfare above that 
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of his children. 
15. There exists no parent/child relationship between Mr. Coando and the children. 
16. The children have bonded with D.Ray Robertson who married their mother January 
11, 1990. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The parental rights of Patrick Coando, natural father to the children should be 
terminated pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-3a-407 and 408. 
2. It is in the best interest of there children that the parental rights of their natural 
father Patrick Coando be terminated. 
ORDER 
1. The legal and procedural standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act do not apply 
in this case. 
2. The Eastern Shoshone Tribe's motion to dismiss is hereby denied and judgement is 
rendered terminating the parental rights of Patrick Coando, natural 
father to the children. 
DATED this ^£Q ^~~ day oC\i^l 1995. 
Juvenile Court Judge 
JUVENILE COURT 
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INDIANS 
(a) Petition; suitable plan; approval by Secretary 
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary; partial retroces-
sion 
(c) Approval of petition; publication in Federal Register; notice; 
reassumption period; correction of causes for disapproval 
(d) Pending actions or proceedings unaffected 
1919. Agreements between states and Indian tribes 
(a) Subject coverage 
(b) Revocation; notice; actions or proceedings unaffected 
1920. Improper removal of child from custody; declination of jurisdiction; 
forthwith return of child: danger exception 
1921. Higher State or Federal standard applicable to protect rights of 
parent or Indian custodian of Indian child 
1922. Emergency removal or placement of child; termination; appropriate 
action 
1923. Effective date 
INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY PROGRAMS 
1931. Grants for on or near reservation programs and child welfare codes 
(a) Statement of purpose; scope of programs 
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for related Social Security or other 
Federal financial assistance programs; assistance for such pro-
grams unaffected; State licensing or approval for qualification 
for assistance under federally assisted program 
1932. Grants for off-reservation programs for additional services 
1933. Funds for on and off reservation programs 
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of Department of Health 
and Human Services; appropriation in advance for payments 
(b) Appropriation authorization under 25 USCS § 13 
1934. "Indian" defined for certain purposes 
RECORDKEEPING, INFORMATION AVAILABILITY, AND 
TIMETABLES 
1951. Information availability to and disclosure by Secretary 
(a) Copy of final decree or order; other information; anonymity 
affidavit; exemption from 5 USCS § 552 
(b) Disclosure of information for enrollment of Indian child in tribe 
or for determination of member rights or benefits; certification 
of entitlement to enrollment 
1952. Rules and regulations 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
1961. Education; day schools; report to congressional committees; particu-
lar consideration of elementary grade facilities 
1962. [Omitted] 
1963. Severability of provisions 
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CROSS REFERENCES 
This chapter is referred to in 25 USCS § 1727. 
§ 1901. Congressional findings 
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the 
Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian 
people, the Congress finds— 
(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitution 
[USCS Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl 3] provides that "The Congress shall 
have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . with Indian tribes'* and, 
through this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary 
power over Indian affairs; 
(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of 
dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the 
protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources; 
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence 
and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United 
States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who 
are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe; 
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up 
by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by 
nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high 
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive 
homes and institutions; and 
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian 
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, 
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian 
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian 
communities and families. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, § 2, 92 Stat. 3069.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Short titles: 
Act Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, § 1, 92 Stat. 3069, provided: 'This Act 
[25 USCS §§1901 et seq.] may be cited as the 'Indian Child Welfare 
Act of 19787'. 
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INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Congress, in enacting Indian Child Welfare Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS §§1901 
<i of 1978 (25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq.) has et seq) is not unconstitutional under equal pro-
vcitically recognized importance of allowing tection clause, since protection of integrity of 
ibal courts to assume full responsibility for Indian families is permissible goal that is ration-
ucement of Indian children in foster care and ally related to fulfillment of Congress' unique 
loptive homes, by granting Indian tribes exclu- guardianship obligation toward Indians. Re Ap-
ve jurisdiction over such proceedings. Johnson plication of Angus (1982) 60 Or App 546, 655 
Frederick (1979, DC ND) 467 F Supp 956. P2d 208 
1902. Congressional declaration of policy 
fhe Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect 
-he best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum 
federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families 
and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will 
eflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance 
) Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs. 
Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, § 3, 92 Stat. 3069.) 
1903. Definitions 
•or the purposes of this Act [25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq.], except as may be 
pecifically provided otherwise, the term— 
(1) "child custody proceeding*' shall mean and include— 
(i) "foster care placement" which shall mean any action removing an 
Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary 
placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian 
or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the 
child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been 
terminated; 
(ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any action 
resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship; 
(iii) "preadoptive placement" which shall mean the temporary place-
ment of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the 
termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive 
placement; and 
(iv) "adoptive placement" which shall mean the permanent placement 
of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a 
final decree of adoption. 
Such term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act 
which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an 
award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents. 
(2) "extended family member" shall be as defined by the law or custom 
of the Indian child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall 
be a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian 
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child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or 
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent; 
(3) "Indian" means any person who is a member of an Indian tribe, or 
who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation as 
defined in section 7 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 
Stat. 688, 689) [43 USCS § 1606]; 
(4) "Indian child" means any unmarried person who is under age 
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible 
for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a 
member of an Indian tribe; 
(5) "Indian child's tribe" means (a) the Indian tribe in which an Indian 
child is a member or eligible for membership or (b), in the case of an 
Indian child who is a member of or eligible for membership in more 
than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the 
more significant contacts; 
(6) "Indian custodian" means any Indian person who has legal custody 
of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to 
whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been trans-
ferred by the parent of such child; 
(7) "Indian organization" means any group, association, partnership, 
corporation, or other legal entity owned or controlled by Indians, or a 
majority of whose members are Indians; 
(8) "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other 
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the 
services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as 
Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in section 3(c) of 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688, 689), as 
amended [42 USCS § 1602(c)]; 
(9) "parent" means any biological parent or parents of an Indian child 
or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, 
including adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the 
unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established; 
(10) "reservation" means Indian country as defined in section 1151 of 
title 18, United States Code [18 USCS §1151] and any lands, not 
covered under such section, title to which is either held by the United 
States in trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by 
any Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United 
States against alienation; 
(11) "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Interior; and 
(12) "tribal court" means a court with jurisdiction over child custody 
proceedings and which is either a Court of Indian Offenses, a court 
established and operated under the code or custom of an Indian tribe, or 
any other administrative body of a tribe which is vested with authority 
over child custody proceedings. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, §4, 92 Stat. 3069.) 
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iesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian 
ustodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 
hild. 
Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 102, 92 Stat. 3071.) 
CROSS REFERENCES 
This section is referred to in 25 USCS §§ 1914, 1916. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
If party wishes to defeat biological parent's requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Re H. 
ctition for return of custody, he or she must (1980, SD) 299 NW2d 812, later app (SD) 316 
•rove that such return is not in child's best NW2d 650. 
merest by showing (1) that remedial and reha- Under Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS 
uhtative programs designed to prevent breakup §§ 1901 et seq.), dependency and neglect must be 
I Indian family had been implemented without proved by clear and convincing evidence. People 
access and (2) that such return of custody is In Interest of S. R. (1982, SD) 323 NW2d 885. 
kely to result in serious harm to child; serious Expert witness requirement of 25 USCS 
arm element must be proved beyond reasonable § 1912(0 was fulfilled by testimony of social 
oubt and must be established by testimony of worker with 4 years experience who has BA 
,uahfied expert witnesses. A B M . v M.H. (1982, degree in social work and has had contact with 
vlaska) 651 P2d 1170. Indians on regular basis, and testimony of direc-
Parental rights in Indian child pursuant to tor of children's shelter and resource center who 
udian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS §§1901 et has BS degree in social work and one year 
q ) may not be terminated on basis of finding towards her master's degree, since approximately 
Mat evidence was clear and convincing that 30 percent of children utilizing shelter are Indi-
ontmued custody would likely result in severe ans. Matter of K. A. B. E. (1982, SD) 325 
•notional and physical damage to child; the Act NW2d 840. 
j 1913. Parental rights; voluntary termination 
a) Consent; record; certification matters; invalid consents. Where any 
parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster care placement 
>r to termination of parental rights, such consent shall not be valid unless 
xecuted in writing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent 
urisdiction and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate that the 
erms and consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail and 
sere fully understood by the parent or Indian custodian. The court shall 
ilso certify that either the parent or Indian custodian fully understood the 
xplanation in English or that it was interpreted into a language that the 
>arent or Indian custodian understood. Any consent given prior to, or 
v ithin ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall not be valid. 
b) Foster care placement; withdrawal of consent. Any parent or Indian 
ustodian may withdraw consent to a foster care placement under State 
aw at any time and, upon such withdrawal, the child shall be returned to 
he parent or Indian custodian. 
c) Voluntary termination of parental rights or adoptive placement; with-
Irawal of consent; return of custody. In any voluntary proceeding for 
ermination of parental rights to, or adoptive placement of, an Indian 
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child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any reason at any 
time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption, as the 
case may be, and the child shall be returned to the parent. 
(d) Collateral attack; vacation of decree and return of custody; limitations. 
After the entry of a final decree of adoption of an Indian child in any State 
court, the parent may withdraw consent thereto upon the grounds that 
consent was obtained through fraud or duress and may petition the court 
to vacate such decree. Upon a finding that such consent was obtained 
through fraud or duress, the court shall vacate such decree and return the 
child to the parent. No adoption which has been effective for at least two 
years may be invalidated under the provisions of this subsection unless 
otherwise permitted under State law. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 103, 92 Stat. 3072.) 
CROSS REFERENCES 
This section is referred to in 25 USCS § 1914. 
§ 1914. Petition to court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate 
action upon showing of certain violations 
Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care placement 
or termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or Indian 
custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian 
child's tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate 
such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of 
sections 101, 102, and 103 of this Act [25 USCS §§ 1911, 1912, 1913]. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 104, 92 Stat. 3072.) 
§ 1915. Placement of Indian children 
(a) Adoptive placements; preferences. In any adoptive placement of an 
Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of 
good cause to the contrary, to a placement with 
(1) a member of the child's extended family; 
(2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or 
(3) other Indian families. 
(b) Foster care or preadoptive placements; criteria; preferences. Any child 
accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement shall be placed in the 
least restrictive setting which most approximates a family and in which his 
special needs, if any, may be met. The child shall also be placed within 
reasonable proximity to his or her home, taking into account any special 
needs of the child. In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a prefer- ^P 
ence shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a ^ 
placement with— 
(i) a member of the Indian child's extended family; 
695 
25 USCS § 1915 I N D I A N S 
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's 
tribe; 
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-
Indian licensing authority; or 
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated 
by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the 
Indian child's needs. 
(c) Tribal resolution for different order of preference; personal preference 
considered; anonymity in application of preferences. In the case of a 
placement under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, if the Indian child's 
tribe shall establish a different order of preference by resolution, the agency 
or court effecting the placement shall follow such order so long as the 
placement is the least restrictive setting appropriate to the particular needs 
of the child, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. Where appropri-
ate, the preference of the Indian child or parent shall be considered: 
Provided, That where a consenting parent evidences a desire for anonym-
ity, the court or agency shall give weight to such desire in applying the 
preferences. 
(d) Social and cultural standards applicable. The standards to be applied in 
meeting the preference requirements of this section shall be the prevailing 
social and cultural standards of the Indian community in which the parent 
or extended family resides or with which the parent or extended family 
members maintain social and cultural ties. 
(e) Record of placement; availability. A record of each such placement, 
under State law, of an Indian child shall be maintained by the State in 
which the placement was made, evidencing the efforts to comply with the 
order of preference specified in this section. Such record shall be made 
available at any time upon the request of the Secretary or the Indian 
child's tribe. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 105, 92 Stat. 3073.) 
§ 1916. Return of custody 
(a) Petition; best interests of child. Notwithstanding State law to the 
contrary, whenever a final decree of adoption of an Indian child has been 
vacated or set aside or the adoptive parents voluntarily consent to the 
termination of their parental rights to the child, a biological parent or prior 
Indian custodian may petition for return of custody and the court shall 
grant such petition unless there is a showing, in a proceeding subject to the 
provisions of section 102 of this Act [25 USCS § 1912], that such return of 
custody is not in the best interests of the child. 
(b) Removal from foster care home; placement procedure. Whenever an 
Indian child is removed from a foster care home or institution for the 
purpose of further foster care, preadoptive, or adoptive placement, such 
placement shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Act [25 USCS 
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§§ 1901 et seq.], except in the case where an Indian child is being returned 
to the parent or Indian custodian from whose custody the child was 
originally removed. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 106, 92 Stat. 3073.) 
§ 1917. Tribal affiliation information and other information for 
protection of rights from tribal relationship; application of subject of 
adoptive placement; disclosure by court 
Upon application by an Indian individual who has reached the age ol 
eighteen and who was the subject of an adoptive placement, the court 
which entered the final decree shall inform such individual of. the tribal 
affiliation, if any, of the individual's biological parents and provide such 
other information as may be necessary to protect any rights flowing from 
the individual's tribal relationship. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 107, 92 Stat. 3073.) 
§ 1918. Reassumption of jurisdiction over child custody proceed-
ings 
(a) Petition; suitable plan; approval by Secretary. Any Indian tribe which 
became subject to State jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of the Act 
of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by title IV of the Act of 
April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78), or pursuant to any other Federal law, may 
reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. Before any Indian 
tribe may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, 
such tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a petition to reassume 
such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdic-
tion. 
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary; partial retrocession. 
(1) In considering the petition and feasibility of the plan of a tribe under 
subsection (a), the Secretary may consider, among other things: 
(i) whether or not the tribe maintains a membership roll or alternative 
provision for clearly identifying the persons who will be affected by 
the reassumption of jurisdiction by the tribe; 
(ii) the size of the reservation or former reservation area which will be 
affected by retrocession and reassumption of jurisdiction by the tribe; 
(iii) the population base of the tribe, or distribution of the population 
in homogeneous communities or geographic areas; and 
(iv) the feasibility of the plan in cases of multitribal occupation of a 
single reservation or geographic area. 
(2) In those cases where the Secretary determines that the jurisdictional 
provisions of section 101(a) of this Act [25 USCS § 1911(a)] are not 
feasible, he is authorized to accept partial retrocession which will enable 
tribes to exercise referral jurisdiction as provided in section 101(b) of 
this Act [25 USCS § 1911(b)], or, where appropriate, will allow them to 
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exercise exclusive jurisdiction as provided in section 101(a) [25 USCS 
§ 1911(a)] over limited community or geographic areas without regard 
for the reservation status of the area affected. 
) Approval of petition; publication in Federal Register; notice; reassump-
<>n period; correction of causes for disapproval. If the Secretary approves 
iy petition under subsection (a), the Secretary shall publish notice of such 
iproval in the Federal Register and shall notify the affected State or 
ates of such approval. The Indian tribe concerned shall reassume juris-
ction sixty days after publication in the Federal Register of notice of 
>proval. If the Secretary disapproves any petition under subsection (a), 
ie Secretary shall provide such technical assistance as may be necessary to 
lable the tribe to correct any deficiency which the Secretary identified as 
cause for disapproval. 
.) Pending actions or proceedings unaffected. Assumption of jurisdiction 
ider this section shall not affect any action or proceeding over which a 
>urt has already assumed jurisdiction, except as may be provided pursu-
it to any agreement under section 109 of this Act [25 USCS § 1919]. 
>Iov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 108, 92 Stat. 3074.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"The Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by title IV of 
the Act of April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78)", referred to in this section, 
is Act Aug. 15, 1953, ch 505, 67 Stat 588, as amended by Act Apr. 11, 
1968, P. L. 90-248, Title IV, B2 Stat. 79. For full classification of such 
Act, consult USCS Tables volumes. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
This section is referred to in 25 USCS §§ 1727, 1923. 
1919. Agreements between States and Indian tribes 
i) Subject coverage. States and Indian tribes are authorized to enter into 
•reements with each other respecting care and custody of Indian children 
id jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, including agreements 
hich may provide for orderly transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case 
asis and agreements which provide for concurrent jurisdiction between 
uites and Indian tribes. 
>) Revocation; notice; actions or proceedings unaffected. Such agreements 
iay be revoked by either party upon one hundred and eighty days' written 
v)tice to the other party. Such revocation shall not affect any action or 
(oceeding over which a court has already assumed jurisdiction, unless the 
;reement provides otherwise. 
NJOV. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 109, 92 Stat. 3074.) 
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CROSS REFERENCES 
This section is referred to in 25 USCS §§1918, 1923. 
§ 1920. Improper removal of child from custody; declination of 
jurisdiction; forthwith return of child: danger exception 
Where any petitioner in an Indian child custody proceeding before a State 
court has improperly removed the child from custody of the parent or 
Indian custodian or has improperly retained custody after a visit or other 
temporary relinquishment of custody, the court shall decline jurisdiction 
over such petition and shall forthwith return the child to his parent .or 
Indian custodian unless returning the child to his parent or custodian 
would subject the child to a substantial and immediate danger or threat of 
such danger. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 110, 92 Stat. 3075.) 
§ 1921. Higher State or Federal standard applicable to protect 
rights of parent or Indian custodian of Indian child 
In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child custody 
proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of 
protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian 
child than the rights provided under this title [25 USCS §§ 1911 et seq.], 
the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal standard. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 111, 92 Stat. 3075.) 
§ 1922. Emergency removal or placement of child; termination; 
appropriate action 
Nothing in this title [25 USCS §§1911 et seq.] shall be construed to 
prevent the emergency removal of an Indian child who is a resident of or 
is domiciled on a reservation, but temporarily located off the reservation, 
from his parent or Indian custodian or the emergency placement of such 
child in a foster home or institution, under applicable State law, in order to 
prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. The State 
authority, official, or agency involved shall insure that the emergency 
removal or placement terminates immediately when such removal or 
placement is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or 
harm to the child and shall expeditiously initiate a child custody proceed-
ing subject to the provisions of this title [25 USCS §§ 1911 et seq.], transfer 
the child to the jurisdiction of the appropriate Indian tribe, or restore the 
child to the parent or Indian custodian, as may be appropriate. 
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 112, 92 Stat. 3075.) 
§ 1923. Effective date 
None of the provisions of this title [25 USCS §§ 1911 et seq.], except 
sections 101(a), 108, and 109 [25 USCS §§ 1911(a), 1918, and 1919], shall 
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tfTect a proceeding under State law for foster care placement, termination 
if parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive placement which 
was initiated or completed prior to one hundred and eighty days after the 
nactment of this Act [enacted Nov 8, 1978], but shall apply to any 
>ubsequent proceeding in the same matter or subsequent proceedings 
effecting the custody or placement of the same child 
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title I, § 113, 92 Stat 3075 ) 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Provisions of Indian Child Welfare Act (25 State (1981, Alaska) 623 P2d 1210 
USCS § 1901 et seq ) do not apply on remand to Provisions of Indian Child Welfare Act of 
irial court of decision to terminate parental 1978 (25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq) do not apply to 
rights where Act was not in effect at time action to vacate adoption where final adoption 
jurental rights were terminated and where there hearing was held within 180 days after Novem 
his been no constitutional challenge to statute ber 8 1978 Re Adoption of Baby Nancy (1980) 
itider which such rights were terminated A v 27 Wash App 278, 616 P2d 1263 
INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY PROGRAMS 
§ 1931. Grants for on or near reservation programs and child 
welfare codes 
(a) Statement of purpose; scope of programs. The Secretary is authorized 
to make grants to Indian tribes and organizations in the establishment and 
operation of Indian child and family service programs on or near reserva-
tions and in the preparation and implementation of child welfare codes 
The objective of every Indian child and family service program shall be to 
prevent the breakup of Indian families and, in particular, to insure that the 
permanent removal of an Indian child from the custody of his parent or 
Indian custodian shall be a last resort Such child and family service 
programs may include, but are not limited to— 
(1) a system for licensing or otherwise regulating Indian foster and 
adoptive homes, 
(2) the operation and maintenance of facilities for the counseling and 
treatment of Indian families and for the temporary custody of Indian 
children, 
(3) family assistance, including homemaker and home counselors, day 
care, afterschool care, and employment, recreational activities, and 
respite care, 
(4) home improvement programs, 
(5) the employment of professional and other trained personnel to assist 
the tribal court in the disposition of domestic relations and child welfare 
matters, 
(6) education and training of Indians, including tribal court judges and 
staff, in skills relating to child and family assistance and service pro-
grams, 
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(7) a subsidy program under which Indian adoptive children may be 
provided support comparable to that for which they would be eligible as 
foster children, taking into account the appropriate State standards oi 
support for maintenance and medical needs, and 
(8) guidance, legal representation, and advice to Indian families involved 
in tribal, State, or Federal child custody proceedings 
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for related Social Security or othei 
Federal financial assistance programs; assistance for such programs unaf-
fected; State licensing or approval for qualification for assistance under 
federally assisted program. Funds appropriated for use by the Secretary in 
accordance with this section may be utilized as non-Federal matching 
share in connection with funds provided under titles IV-B and XX of the 
Social Security Act [42 USCS §§620 et seq, 1397 et seq] or under an> 
other Federal financial assistance programs which contribute to the pur 
pose for which such funds are authorized to be appropriated for use undei 
this Act [25 USCS §§1901 et seq] The provision or possibility ol 
assistance under this Act [25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq ] shall not be a basis for 
the denial or reduction of any assistance otherwise authorized under titles 
IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act [42 USCS §§ 620 et seq , 1397 et 
seq ] or any other federally assisted program For purposes of qualifying 
for assistance under a federally assisted program, licensing or approval ot 
foster or adoptive homes or institutions by an Indian tribe shall be deemed 
equivalent to licensing or approval by a State 
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title II, § 201, 92 Stat 3075 ) 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Regulations implementing Indian Child Wei reservation for social services funding purposes 
fare Act of 1978 (25 USCS §§1931 to 1934) do Navajo Tribe v Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
not permit Indian tribe to combine with social (1982) 89 ID 424 
services corporation within area designated near 
§ 1932. Grants for off-reservation programs for additional services 
The Secretary is also authorized to make grants to Indian organizations to 
establish and operate off-reservation Indian child and family service pro-
grams which may include, but are not limited to— 
(1) a system fo» regulating, maintaining, and supporting Indian foster 
and adoptive homes, including a subsidy program under which Indian 
adoptive children may be provided support comparable to that for which 
they would be eligible as Indian foster children, taking into account the 
appropriate State standards of support for maintenance and medical 
needs, 
(2) the operation and maintenance of facilities and services for counsel 
ing and treatment of Indian families and Indian foster and adoptive 
children, 
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(3) family assistance, including homemaker and home counselors, day 
care, afterschool care, and employment, recreational activities, and 
respite care, and 
(4) guidance, legal representation, and advice to Indian families involved 
in child custody proceedings 
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title II, § 202, 92 Stat 3076) 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Tins section is referred to in 25 USCS § 1934 
§ 1933. Funds for on and off reservation programs 
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of Department of Health and 
Human Services; appropriation in advance for payments. In the establish-
ment, operation, and funding of Indian child and family service programs, 
both on and off reservation, the Secretary may enter into agreements with 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and 
Human Services], and the latter Secretary is hereby authorized for such 
purposes to use funds appropriated for similar programs of the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare [Department of Health and Human 
Services] Provided, That authority to make payments pursuant to such 
agreements shall be effective only to the extent and in such amounts as 
may be provided in advance by appropriation Acts 
(b) Appropriation authorization under 25 USCS § 13. Funds for the 
purposes of this Act [25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq ] may be appropriated 
pursuant to the provisions of the Act of November 2, 1921 (42 Stat 208), 
as amended [25 USCS § 13] 
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title II, § 203, 92 Stat 3076) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Explanatory notes: 
The bracketed words "Secretary of Health and Human Services" and 
"Department of Health and Human Services" are inserted on authority 
of Act Oct 17, 1979, P L 96 88, Title V, § 509, 93 Stat 695, which 
appears as 20 USCS § 3508, and which redesignated the Secretary and 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as the Secretary and 
Department of Health and Human Services, respectively, and provided 
that any reference to the Secretary or Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, in any law in force on the effective date of such Act 
Oct 17, 1979, shall be deemed to refer and apply to fhe Secretary or 
Department of Health and Human Services, respectively, except to the 
extent such reference is to a function or office transferred to the 
Secretary or Department of Education under such Act Oct 17, 1979 
CROSS REFERENCES 
This section is referred to in 25 USCS § 1934 
§ 1934. "Indian" defined for certain purposes 
For the purposes of sections 202 and 203 of this title [25 USCS §§ 1932, 
1933], the term "Indian" shall include persons defined in section 4(c) of 
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the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976 (90 Stat 1400, 1401) [2" 
USCS § 1603(c)] 
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title II, § 204, 92 Stat 3077 ) 
RECORDKEEPING, INFORMATION AVAILABILITY, AND 
TIMETABLES 
§ 1951. Information availability to and disclosure by Secretary 
(a) Copy of final decree or order; other information; anonymity affidavit 
exemption from 5 USCS § 552. Any State court entering a final decree oi 
order in any Indian child adoptive placement after the date of enactmen 
of this Act [enacted Nov 8, 1978] shall provide the Secretary with a cop\ 
of such decree or order together with such other information as may l> 
necessary to show— 
(1) the name and tribal affiliation of the child, 
(2) the names and addresses of the biological parents, 
(3) the names and addresses of the adoptive parents, and 
(4) the identity of any agency having files or information relating n 
such adoptive placement 
Where the court records contain an affidavit of the biological parent o 
parents that their identity remain confidential, the court shall include sue! 
aflidavit with the other information The Secretary shall insure that th 
confidentiality of such information is maintained and such informatioi 
shall not be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U S C 552), a 
amended [5 USCS § 552] 
(b) Disclosure of information for enrollment of Indian child in tribe or fo 
determination of member rights or benefits; certification of entitlement t< 
enrollment. Upon the request of the adopted Indian child over the age o 
eighteen, the adoptive or foster parents of an Indian child, or an Indiai 
tribe, the Secretary shall disclose such information as may be necessary fo 
the enrollment of an Indian child in the tribe in which the child may b 
eligible for enrollment or for determining any rights or benefits associatu 
with that membership Where the documents relating to such child contan 
an affidavit from the biological parent or parents requesting anonymity, th 
Secretary shall certify to the Indian child's tribe, where the informatioi 
warrants, that the child's parentage and other circumstances of birth entitl 
the child to enrollment under the criteria established by such tribe 
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title III, § 301, 92 Stat 3077 ) 
§ 1952. Rules and regulations 
Within one hundred and eighty days after the enactment of this Ac 
[enacted Nov 8, 1978], the Secretary shall promulgate such rules am 
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